Search results for " and Scope"

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El nuevo escenario del orden público en el arbitraje : comentario a la STC de España, Sala Primera, núm. 17/2021, de 15 de febrero.

2021

The Constitutional Court delimits the concept and scope of public order, the requirement to state the grounds and the judicial review within the framework of the action for annulment of arbitral awards. The Constitutional Court rejects the jurisprudential line of the High Court of Justice of Madrid regarding the broadening of the concept of public policy and prevents the review of the merits of the case through the action for annulment.

Arbitral award:CIENCIAS JURÍDICAS [UNESCO]de 15 de febrero. Blanco Garcíagrounds for the outcome 1022 1031the requirement to state the grounds and the judicial review within the framework of the action for annulment of arbitral awards. The Constitutional Court rejects the jurisprudential line of the High Court of Justice of Madrid regarding the broadening of the concept of public policy and prevents the review of the merits of the case through the action for annulment. Laudo arbitralmotivación2070-8157 22082 Revista Boliviana de Derecho 584568 2021 32 8055247 El nuevo escenario del orden público en el arbitraje comentario a la STC de EspañaAna Isabel The Constitutional Court delimits the concept and scope of public orderSala Primeraorden públiconúm. 17/2021nulidadUNESCO::CIENCIAS JURÍDICASnullitypublic order
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How significant is yardstick competition among governments? Three reasons to dig deeper

2013

22 pages; The significance of yardstick competition among governments is now confirmed with regard to fiscal variables. This is an important result but the significance of the mechanism must also be sought in a context broader than that of fiscal federalism and without limitation to relations and processes fully observable. Three points are made. Even in the case of governments trying to mimic each other over a single variable, additional variables are involved in an important way. Yardstick competition can be latent without being ineffective. Its major effect, then, is to set bounds to the choices that office-holders could think of making. Finally, the mechanism is a hidden albeit essentia…

JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting BehaviordecentralizationContext (language use)Public choiceDecentralizationCompetition (economics)JEL : H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H77 - Intergovernmental Relations • Federalism • SecessionGovernmentsYardstickJEL : H - Public Economics/H.H1 - Structure and Scope of Government/H.H1.H11 - Structure Scope and Performance of Governmentfederalism0502 economics and business050602 political science & public administrationEconomics[ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and finances050207 economicspolitical yardstick competition[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceJEL : H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H70 - GeneralComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUSPublic economicsJEL: H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H77 - Intergovernmental Relations • Federalism • Secession05 social sciencesJEL: H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H70 - General16. Peace & justice[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Financepolitical yardstick competitionfederalismdecentralizationsystemsJEL: H - Public Economics/H.H1 - Structure and Scope of Government/H.H1.H11 - Structure Scope and Performance of Government0506 political scienceYardstick competitionsystemsFiscal federalismFederalismJEL : D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting BehaviorEconomics and Finance Politics and Public PolicyPublic finance
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On the Returns to Invention within Firms: Evidence from Finland

2018

International audience; In this paper we merge individual income data, firm-level data, patenting data, and IQ data in Finland over the period 1988–2012 to analyze the returns to invention for inventors and their coworkers or stakeholders within the same firm. We find that: (i) inventors collect only 8 percent of the total private return from invention; (ii) entrepreneurs get over 44 percent of the total gains; (iii) bluecollar workers get about 26 percent of the gains and the rest goes to white-collar workers. Moreover, entrepreneurs start with significant negative returns prior to the patent application, but their returns subsequently become highly positive.

JEL: O - Economic Development Innovation Technological Change and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual CapitalINNOVATIONPatent applicationvoitotJEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L2 - Firm Objectives Organization and Behavior/L.L2.L25 - Firm Performance: Size Diversification and Scope0502 economics and business050602 political science & public administrationdistribution of profits050207 economicsJEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D2 - Production and Organizationsta511keksinnötinventions05 social sciencesprofitsvoitot (talous)General MedicineIndividual incomeJEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance/G.G3.G32 - Financing Policy • Financial Risk and Risk Management • Capital and Ownership Structure • Value of Firms • Goodwill[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Financeyritykset0506 political science8. Economic growthJEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L2 - Firm Objectives Organization and Behavior/L.L2.L26 - EntrepreneurshipDemographic economicsBusinessJEL: O - Economic Development Innovation Technological Change and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and IncentivesenterprisesMerge (version control)voitonjako
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